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Abstract: The paper aims at researching the interconnection between two key concepts in political 
sciences Ŕ Ŗdemocracyŗ and Ŗidentityŗ. The analysis is focused on the Danube Region as an example 
of a macro-regional construct in the multi-level governance system of the European Union. The 
author is working on a PhD dissertation dedicated to the democratic deficits in the European Union, 
with a specific focus on two of the newest member states Ŕ Hungary and Romania. Since both 
Ŗdemocracyŗ and Ŗidentityŗ are notions that have not been defined by consent in the post-communist 
member states of the Union, the paper chooses to particularly examine their impact in Romania and 
Hungary by researching different information sources and statistical data. The paper has to examine 
the level of interdependency of the post-communist political identity of Hungary and Romania and 
the state of democracy and its institutions. The results have to be further discussed not only in the 
context of both countriesř EU-membership, but also with a view to their belonging to the newly 
established Danube macro-region. The following paper and its results are part of the long-term PhD 
research of the author. The study will add value to the analysis of two fundamental notions in the 
theory of political and social sciences by trying to examine the level of their interconnection in two 
Danube countries.  
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1. Introduction  
Democracy as a concept has been discussed for about 2500 years Ŕ a period which 
is more than a sufficient for certain traditions to be established. In fact, during these 
twenty-five centuries of development democracy has not only been debated: it has 
also been praised, supported, practiced, attacked, rejected, re-thought and re-
established. 
However, the triumph of democracy has been witnessed during the last few 
decades of its more than two millennia old biography. The process of giving tribute 
to the unifying force of democracy in Europe dates back to the dark post-war 
period. The cataclysm that all Europeans had experienced and had shared the 
responsibility for made them re-consider one of their greatest achievements, 
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namely the democratic ideals. The idea of the European Union has been indeed 
formed on the solid foundation of everything that the democracy has achieved so 
far. On the eve of the third millennium of democratic evolution, practically all 
countries in Europe, regardless of the fact that they are EU members or not, had 
something in common Ŕ a democratic governance.   
As an integral part of this changing world Europe is facing with a variety of 
challenges. United in diversity, it strives to guarantee the viability of values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
Europe is building its image and its identity based on the sense of being the source 
where all these values emerged and evolved. Moreover, the foundation of the 
European Union is its democratic nature. Democracy is considered the first and 
most important condition for a successful application for membership. The added 
value of the international relations promoted by the Union can be found in the 
promotion and distribution of democratic values and principles. The diplomacy of 
the European Union puts democratic dialogue and cooperation first, whereas its 
foreign policy is very often regarded as a powerful instrument for fostering the 
process of democratization of the EU partners. Therefore, democracy and its values 
build the foundation of the evolving European identity, whose goal is to strengthen 
in a paradoxical way the European democracy.  
Yet, the democratic power of the European Union is weakened by several factors 
that characterize the political, economic and social climate on the continent today. 
Europe is shaken by a continuous economic and euro crisis that proved to be 
difficult to be overcome. At stake is more than the financial stability of several 
countries Ŕ much more endangered is the solidarity and the political cohesion 
between all member states. Inevitably, the countries that are still in the waiting 
room of the Union can feel the impact of these turbulent events. In times of trouble 
the European countries have shown that they prefer to capsulate themselves within 
their national politics in an attempt to avoid the negative influence coming from 
outside. The ongoing crisis in Europe has however proved that this strategy is not a 
success story. Moreover, the political alienation at EU level has led to the rise of 
forgotten trends at national levels. As a result of his obsession with the economic 
troubles, Europe has allowed some countries to become unsafe places for 
democracy. These developments have illustrated the words of John F. Kennedy 
who said that Ŗfor as long as democracy fails to flourish in all countries, it cannot 
thrive in one aloneŗ.  
Taking into consideration the complexity of the multi-level governance system of 
the European Union, we have to bear in mind that all multi-level processes are 
interconnected and interdependent. According to the dominant principle of 
subsidiarity, the lower the level of decision-making, the more democratic and 
legitimate it has to be. Consequently, the modern perception of political identity is 
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those of a multiple one Ŕ covering not only the vertical, but also the horizontal 
belongings of each individual. The concept of multiple identity refers by default to 
the notion of democracy because it guarantees the right of free self-determination, 
regardless whether it comes to persons, political or national constructions. The 
newly introduced by the European Commission macro-regional governance 
approach fits into this constellation, aiming to bring the decision-making process 
closer to the citizens, thus uniting national and subnational entities and identifying 
common problems.  
As part of the European Union as well as the Danube macro-region the countries in 
Eastern Europe have to Ŗsynchronizeŗ their democratic institutions and practices 
with the requirements of the shared vision for a multi-level, decentralized European 
democracy. Thus, the transition to democracy in the post-communist countries is 
marked by the specifics of the simultaneous transition from communist through 
post-communist to democratic identity. Several questions can be raised in this 
regard: did the ex-soviet countries build the relevant to their current and future 
aspirations democratic identity; if not, is it possible for a democracy to function 
properly when it is based on a post-communist, rather than on a democratic 
identity. This paper aims at researching the complex relationship between 
democracy and identity by examining case studies coming from two of the newest 
EU member-states, namely Hungary and Romania.  
 
2. Democracy and Identity  
Democracy can be best explained by its dynamics and variable nature. Ever since 
its emergence in Ancient Greece for around 2500 years democracy has been a 
subject of debates and discussions. A variety of descriptions can be found in the 
scientific literature but there is still no one generally accepted definition of the 
concept.  
The democratic idea is too often equated with the meaning of the word democracy. 
The term derives from the Greek words „δήμοςŗ Ŕ demos - people, и „κράτοςŗ Ŕ 
kratos Ŕ power, rule. The literal translation of the Greek „δημοκρατίαŗ is rule of the 
people, government by the people. This definition leads to at least two 
interpretations:  
1. people have sovereign power and they can participate directly or indirectly 
in the governance;  
2. people govern, i.e. there is a direct democracy as we know it in Ancient 
Greece.  
After analyzing the etymological democracy it turns out that it does not define the 
criteria by which we can determine the degree of democracy, nor does specify the 
democratic values, institutions and practices that need to be validated. In this 
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regard, Giovanni Sartori argues that more important than the etymology is the 
meaning attributed to the concept of democracy. Furthermore, Rousseau points out 
that if we consider the term only in its literal meaning we will find out that a real 
democracy has never existed. 
In 1863 the president of the USA Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as a 
Ŗgovernment of the people, by the people, for the peopleŗ (Sartori, 1992, p. 59). 
The Lincolnřs formula is one of the most frequently cited definitions. However, in 
a more detailed analysis it shows the same weaknesses as the etymological 
interpretation of the concept.  
Despite its imperfections it has to be noted that the etymological interpretation is of 
major importance in the context of the discussion about sources of power and 
legitimacy. The thesis that power belongs to people emphasizes on citizens as key 
actors in bottom-up governance which ensures the legitimacy of the government. It 
is therefore concluded that state and government have to act in order to achieve the 
public interest (Ŗgovernment for the peopleŗ). In other words, this means that for a 
functioning democracy the demos has to precede the kratos and not in a reverse 
order (Sartori, 1992).  
In its early years democracy has been defined opposite to other types of 
government like tyranny and oligarchy. Ancient philosophers did not accept 
democracy in its pure form, but rather as an element of a complex government. 
Centuries later the constitutions of the English and Dutch republics highlighted that 
democratic laws in themselves are not a sufficient precondition to protect 
effectively the interests of the people Ŕ much more important is the civic 
engagement and the willingness to participate in the legislative process. Thus, their 
political culture put an emphasis on the concept of political equality which is one 
of the catalysts for the development of modern democracy. Another advocate of the 
idea of equal rights is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who, inspired by the ideals of the 
French Revolution, states that "everyone, regardless of gender, education, property 
status, has the right to express their will on various social issuesŖ (Crick, 2008, p. 
29). Additionally to equal political participation Rousseau equates democracy and 
popular sovereignty. According to him, democracy is a synonym of sovereignty, 
whereas sovereignty is expressed by the law. Karl Popper led the debate on 
democracy in other direction, heading for the issue of accountability and control 
over the government. According to him, the discussion about the sources of power 
is of secondary importance because it is much more important to focus on how 
control is exercised. Therefore, Popper defines democracy as "a system of 
institutions that allows the implementation of public control over the government 
and its replacement by the will of the governed, and enables them to carry out 
reforms without the use of violence, even against the will of the government" 
(Yankov, 2001, p. 24). Sartori also emphasizes the importance of control in the 
democratic process. He argues that the transfer of power takes place in two 
Vol. 4, No. 2/2014 
 35 
directions (bottom-up and top-down) and the role of democratic control is to 
maintain a balance between the both forms of empowerment (Sartori, 1992, p. 54).  
The modern idea of democracy includes one additional aspect. European and U.S. 
Constitutions stipulate not only equality, but also the right to choose between 
various forms for direct or indirect civil participation in the legislative process of 
the relevant state. The sovereign power of the people is supplemented by individual 
rights and freedoms. Thus, the legal process not only establishes and protects 
individual rights, but limits them, obliging citizens to respect the rights of others. 
This is an important innovation of modern democracy. In his definition of 
democracy Ralf Dahrendorf focuses on the contribution of pluralistic civil society. 
According to the political scientist, an active civil society is a precondition for a 
well-functioning democracy. Determining democratic freedoms without effective 
control by various civil associations and organizations cannot guarantee protection 
from the so-called Ŗtyranny of the majorityŗ. Moreover, Ŗwithout real pluralism, 
democracy is caricatured to simply exercising the vote, ŗsays Dahrendorf (Yankov, 
2001, p. 25)
.
 
Morris Duvergier considers democracy to be rather a universal principle, 
describing it as a Ŗfreedom for the people and for each part of the peopleŗ as 
formulated in the French Constitution of 1793. The modern point of view of 
Charles Taylor on the other hand concentrates on a strong collective identity as a 
precondition for the emergence of democracy. Robert Dahl differentiates between 
ideal and real democracy, whereas Giovanni Sartori classifies it into ideal 
democracy and real polyarchy.  
After a brief overview of some of the attempts to define democracy it turned out 
that most of the theories have something in common. In general, modern 
democracy is characterized by the following features: representative government, 
universal civil rights and free elections, civil control over politics and government. 
Similarities can be found in the views of researchers on the inherent dangers 
belonging to the democratic regimes that could occur in the case of 
misinterpretation of the meaning of democracy.  
Democracy and identity have their dynamic character in common. The re-thinking 
of identity and the formation of a new one is a long-lasting process and cannot be 
regarded as a static structure. According to Jenkins identity refers to the way in 
which individuals and communities differ from each other and shape accordingly 
their social relationships with other individuals and communities (Jenkins, 1996, p. 
4). Moreover, Hall states that Ŗidentities are more the product of the marking of 
difference and exclusion, that they are the sign of an identical, naturally-
constituted unityŗ and adds that Ŗidentities can function as points of identification 
and attachment only because of their capacity to excludeŗ (Jenkins, 1996, p. n29). 
After the fall of the previous regimes and in times of re-shaping political 
boundaries, the new democracies in Europe faced the challenge to join different 
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communities in a short period of time, to establish new institutions and to adapt to 
the new realities. Meanwhile, it turned out that the relevant identity transformation 
could not be completed.   
 
3. “New” Democracies and “Old” Identities 
The analysis of the political developments in Hungary and Romania can lead to 
some useful conclusions about the way two disputable in Eastern Europe notions Ŕ 
democracy and identity Ŕ influence each other. 
In the 80s of the 20
th
 century Hungary was facing significant economic problems Ŕ 
almost all economic indicators testified a deep crisis characterized by high debt 
rates, need for further external financing, low productivity and export rates as well 
as outdated economic mechanisms. The negative demographic trends were seen as 
an additional aggravating factor that deepened the social crisis. 
In the context of this deepening crisis the Hungarian society began to differentiate, 
thus moving away from the communist ideal of homogeneity and equality. It was 
obvious that Hungarian citizens raised voices against the inability of the ruling elite 
to avoid the expanding crisis. In contrast, politicians seemed to underestimate the 
civil dissatisfaction and Ŗspoke of symptoms and exaggerated public consciousness 
of crisisŗ (Bayer, Band 22, p. 1). The climate offered opportunities for the so far 
powerless opposition to accumulate constructive energy and to strengthen its 
position. Under these circumstances, an alternative of the ruling party emerged Ŕ 
new elite that began to publicly oppose the power and to gradually gain the support 
of the large societal groups. Once the position of the government was questioned, 
that implied a questioned legitimacy and a need for transformation. Jуzsef Bayer 
argued that as a result a political pluralism emerged and issues such as free unions 
and free democratic deliberations were put on the public agenda. Finally, the 
Central Committee of the party approved the multi-party system and gave up its 
right to appoint people to the leading positions in the state. In October 1988 the 
party convened a Congress whose outcome put an end to the one-party system and 
practically dissolved the communist party. A new Hungarian Socialist Party was 
founded by former members but its role in the political life of the country was 
limited to the status of an equal competitor in free democratic elections.  
On 23th October 1989 the new constitution was proclaimed and entered into force. 
It stipulated that Hungary was a republic that guaranteed the rights of citizens and 
the multi-party system, prohibited the exercise of a monopoly power, proclaimed 
the freedom of religion and of economic competition as well as the equality of 
private properties. In terms of the institutional structure, the Hungarian constitution 
empowered the parliament to represent people and to hold the government 
accountable. Last, but not least, a Constitutional Court was set up with the main 
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goal to guarantee the democratic freedom and principles of division of powers 
stipulated in the new basic law of the republic.  
To draw a conclusion, it is evident that the transition from totalitarian regime to 
democratic system in Hungary took place gradually, over several stages, peacefully 
and relatively carefully. The change has been prepared within almost a decade and 
for that reason it cannot be defined as revolutionary or unexpected. This brief 
retrospective review gives an insight into the process of forming the foundations of 
the Hungarian democracy.  
After the change of the political system in Hungary, the accession to the European 
Union became the main objective of the foreign policy of the country. The political 
dynamics in the years after the fall of the communist regime was characterized by a 
consensus Ŕ not only at political, but also at civil level Ŕ about the European 
perspective of Hungary. It was therefore agreed upon the strategic priorities of the 
governance Ŕ building democracy, establishing market economy and fostering the 
rule of law aiming at meeting the Copenhagen criteria on political, economic and 
legal approximation issues and transferring the regulations of acquis 
communautaire.  
Hungary acquired a full-fledged membership on 1
st
 May 2004. The country joined 
the Union together with nine countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary 
entered the European home, based principally on common values, with the 
confident of being one of the most democratic among the ex-authoritarian regimes 
in this part of the continent. This sense of distinction was reinforced by the fact that 
Hungary was the third newly joined member state appointed to host the rotating 
presidency of the Council of the European Union. This credit given by the 
European partners in combination with the first success stories of the membership 
at domestic level were undermined by the crisis of democracy that broke out in the 
eve of the celebrations of the 7-year presence in the EU. 
2010 marked another turning point in recent history of Hungary. The beginning of 
the new decade coincided with the schedule for conducting the 6
th
 free general 
elections that are the main attribute of a functioning democracy. The result of the 
first round of the elections was that the conservative party Fidesz has managed to 
win the absolute majority of seats in the parliament and was able to form a new 
government on its own. The victory parade of Fidesz and its leader Victor Orban 
continued in the second election round when the union between him and the 
Christian Democratic Peopleřs Party won 263 of the 386 seats and got a two-thirds 
majority that in practice is required when the constitution and other fundamental 
laws have to be amended. After the first round Fidesz has already acquired the 
right to form the next government of the country, but the majority after the second 
round allowed it to pass legislation without negotiating for support with the 
representatives of the opposition. Moreover, Fidesz became the first non-coalition 
government in post-communist Hungary.  
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The first half of 2011 was expected as the first challenge not only for the new 
Orbanřs government, but also for Hungary as a new member state of the European 
Union. In the period between January and June Hungary was scheduled to host the 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union. This responsibility in terms of 
shaping the agenda and managing the related complex processes was considered to 
be a significant test for the Hungarian democracy.  
The success of the long-awaited presidency and its ambitious program that 
included visions for growth and employment, strengthening Europe and focusing 
on the future EU enlargement was threatened by a reform concerning the media 
sector. Under the spotlight was the new media law which targeted at the fourth 
power. The law came into force on 1
st
 January and coincided with the start of the 
rotating presidency. By passing the new media law the government succeeded in 
establishing several widely criticized reforms. 
The controversial law passed in a crucial period in the post-communist Hungarian 
history was followed by a wide range of critical reactions in whole Europe. 
Christoph Steegmans, spokesman of one of the leading figures in the EU, namely 
the German chancellor Angela Merkel, said that Ŗas a future president of the 
European Union Hungary naturally has a special responsibility for the image of the 
European Union as a wholeŗ (The Economist, 2012). 
If the adoption of the media law at the end of 2010 raised a wave of criticism and 
concerns about the application of fundamental democratic principles, the 
amendment of the Constitution put the whole democratic system in Hungary in 
question. The new Constitution came into force on the first anniversary of the 
media law Ŕ on 1st January 2012. Concerns were raised because of the short terms 
in which it was introduced as well as of the lack of consultation with other 
parliamentary represented political parties. The government could afford it because 
it relied on the two-thirds majority in the parliament gained after the electoral 
victory in 2010. Just because of the precedential majority the legitimacy of the law 
seemed to be guaranteed. In a report about the state of democracy in Hungary the 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee described the procedure as an Ŗad hoc and speedy 
mannerŗ of introducing the changes in the Basic Law of the country (Norwegian 
Helsinki Committee, 2012, p. 1). 
Hungary was the only post-communist country that did not adopt a new 
Constitution after the collapse of the Soviet Union. That was one of the reasons 
why Orbanřs party had already declared its ambition to amend the Constitution in 
its political platform. It was not surprising that the new government quickly 
decided to put this intention into practice. The ruling party has therefore presented 
its constitutional reform as a final break with the communist heritage of the 
country. Opponents of the government recognized this argumentation as a populist 
approach. On 21
st
 March 2011 a draft for a new Constitution was submitted to the 
Parliament, while the existing text of the Basic Law was declared void. As follow 
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up of his rhetoric about revolution, Viktor Orban and his team introduced the draft 
of the Constitution as ŖEaster Constitutionŗ, thus referring to the revival and 
rebirth of Hungary.  
If we can say that the democratic crisis in Hungary that has always performed as an 
excellent student was surprising for Europe, even if it was alarming, the situation in 
the neighbor country Romania was not so unexpected. Indeed, there are a lot of 
similarities between both countries. However, Hungary has been regarded as a 
special case in Central and Eastern Europe, whereas Romania was lagging behind. 
In fact, Romania did not welcome the democracy in the way a European country is 
expected to do it. Exactly two centuries after the French Revolution that marked a 
significant step towards the rise of the democracy in Europe, the Romanians had 
conducted their own revolution. The Romanian Revolution of 1989 ended the 
communist regime and led to the execution of its dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. The 
transformation happened Ŗin a snapŗ because all revolutionary actions lasted more 
than a week.  
A brief overview of the political events in Romania since the end of the Ceausescu 
era leads us to the conclusions that the country has been governed under the 
circumstances of an extended revolution characterized by political instability, too 
frequent change of power, premature mandates, various affairs with political 
participation, no firmly established political values and positions, political 
nomadism as well as populism. The culmination of this extended revolution was 
reached in the summer of 2012 when the current Prime Minister Victor Ponta 
began a power struggle with his opponent occupying the presidential post. As a 
result Mr. Ponta has crossed some acceptable limits by changing officials on key 
positions, by trying to influence the work of the judiciary or even by ignoring it. 
The plot of this ridiculous from a European point of view drama was based on the 
main objective to remove the President who belongs to the opposition and to have 
the whole state apparatus under control. Finally, the Prime Minister did not succeed 
to implement his entire plan because the low interest of the Romanians in the 
outcome of the impeachment referendum has blocked the power triumph strategy 
of the Premier. With this, the people of Romania have voted a double no-
confidence: on the one hand against the Prime Minister by contributing to the 
failure of his plan; on the other hand, against the President who received almost 9 
million votes in favour for his suspension.  
Even though the struggle has not changed the status quo in Romania so far, it has 
brought to the surface some very serious concerns. First of all, Ponta has illustrated 
that the democracy is not safe even within the European Union and it can be easily 
challenged without having any mechanisms to prevent aggressive attacks. 
Secondly, the political crisis has shown that the power in Romania is more than 
transferred powers from the sovereign to the representatives. In the case of 
Romania the democratic institutions as such give way to clashes promoting 
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personal or party interests. Moreover, this has turned out to be symptomatic for the 
Romanian democracy which is a reason for deep concerns. 
The President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso was among the 
first that has condemned the Romanian government for undermining trust in the 
rule of law. Mr. Barroso underlined that a well-functioning judicial system and 
respect for democratic institutions and the rule of law are crucial for every member 
state of the European Union. In a statement published on 18
th
 July 2012 Barroso 
claimed that Ŗexceptional events in Romania have been a major source of concern 
for the Commission and for the European Unionŗ and added that these 
developments Ŗhave shaken our trustŗ (Barroso, 2012). 
In fact, the EU had limited possibilities to supervise democracy, even though it is a 
value that has laid the foundation of the organization. Furthermore, in areas like 
judiciary or media freedom the EU had no powers to intervene. In the case of 
Romania there is still the hope that democracy can help itself to be safeguarded: the 
fatigue of the ordinary citizens with the power struggle and party accusations and 
their desire to join the Schengen area could be strong messages for a Prime 
Minister who wants to win the next elections and to gain legitimacy in its own 
country, especially in a moment when he lacks it in the international context.  
 
4. Conclusion  
A lot of things have happened recently throughout Europe. Constant challenges to 
the various EU freedoms, like for example the rise of nationalism, Euro-sceptism, 
populism, even radicalism or the threats to the free movement of citizens seem to 
flourish in the context of a contemporary economic crisis. Beginning to develop 
slowly from the national electoral agendas, such phenomena can easily and very 
rapidly put the achievements of the European integration in question. What is even 
worse, they contribute to the rise of mistrust between the different member states 
and their leaders.  
What Hungary and Romania have in common, however, is the inclination towards 
authoritarian power and the disrespect for fundamental democratic principles: the 
rule of law and the separation of powers. The Hungarian contribution to the list of 
threats to democracy in Europe contains in the so-called Ŗtyranny of the majorityŗ 
Ŕ the democratic crisis in Hungary has practically shown how the democratically 
elected majority can misuse the democracy and try to transform it into authoritarian 
regime. Romania has added one more problem, namely the populism. The rise of 
the populism is dangerous for democracy because it put the clash between political 
alternatives in the background and emphasizes on the scandals instead. Thus, the 
one opponent is classified as plagiarist, while the other is announced to be a former 
member of the communist elite. Therefore, a political environment that has such a 
structure is a good place for two parallel processes to develop: depoliticization of 
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the political competition on the one hand and politicization of independent organs 
and structures, like banks, courts etc., on the other hand. The former leads to the 
focusing on the ethics of politicians and their personal relations and qualities. 
Consequently, the politics turns into a personal conflict.  
The developments both in Hungary and in Romania has shown that democratic 
achievements are not irreversible and that the principles of the rule of law, of 
liberty as well as the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which 
according to Article 6 of the Treaty on EU lay the foundations of the Union, are not 
protected for violations. It is obvious that as the Guardian of the Treaties, the 
European Commission should act as a Guardian of democracy too. The institution 
has to react immediately to democratic violations of any type. The same applies to 
the European Parliament as the only European institution that represents the 
interests of the citizens. Breaches of the EU law or of the traditional democratic 
values could not remain unaddressed otherwise the trend will continue to spread 
across Europe, as the case with the two neighbor countries has shown. 
25 years after the fall of the communist regimes across Europe, almost all of the 
former non-democratic countries have joined the democratic par excellence 
European Union. Still, it turns out that they havenřt completed their transition from 
post-communist to fully democratic governance systems. Even though all 
democratic institutions and practices have been set up, it can be assumed that in 
this case it is rather a question of updating political culture and identity to the new 
realities.  
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